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THE SCIENTER REQUIREMENT IN ACTIONS 
UNDER RULE 10h-5t 
DAVID G. EPSTEIN* 
More than twenty years have now elapsed since a private right of 
action under rule lOb-51 was first recognized judicially. In the interim, 
rule lOb-5 has become "the most prolific source of litigation since Henry 
Ford invented the flivver."2 And, the Rule is assuming even greater im-
portance. Private actions under lOb-5 in excess of seventy-seven million 
dollars have been instituted against Texas Gulf Sulphur and its officers 
and directors.3 The Securities and Exchange Commission proposals to 
implement the Wheat Report will result in an increased emphasis on 
lOb-5.4 Notwithstanding the importance of rule lOb-5 and the numerous 
reported decisions5 and legal writings devoted to it and its nuances, 
t The awkwardness of entitling a study of a specific element of a cause of action 
under a rule promulgated pursuant to a section of one of several federal securities 
laws brings to mind the remark of Lord Devlin: 
Composing a title for an address is sometimes just as difficult as composing 
the address itself. I wish that a legal composer was given the same freedom 
on this point as a musical composer. He can write what he likes and can 
call it a Sonata in F minor, or a Suite for Strings and Timpani-or, if he 
considers himself very famous, just Devlin in G. 
P. DEVLIN, SAMPLES OF LAWMAKING 104 (1962). 
* Member of Arizona and Texas Bars; Associate in the firm of Streich, Lang, 
Weeks, Cardon & French, Phoenix, Arizona. 
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1969). Rule lOb-5 was promulgated by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission under the enabling authority of § 10 (b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964). The rule provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
( c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
2 Bangs, R1tle 10b-S and the South Dakota Lawyer, 14 S.D.L. REV. 56, 79 
(1969). 
3 See Knauss, Disclosure Requirements-Changing Concepts of Liability, 24 
Bus. LAWYER 43, 53 (1968). 
~SEC, PROPOSALS To IMPLEMENT THE WHEAT REPORT (CCH Special Rep. 
No. 272, 1969). 
6 Decisions involving rule lOb-5 are mainly on the pleadings. As Professor 
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serious questions remain largely unanswered, particularly with regard 
to the elements of a private action under the Rule.6 This article will treat 
one such question : the role of scienter in a private action under rule 
lOb-5 for misrepresentations in the sale of securities. 
!. THE MEANING OF SCIENTER 
It is first necessary to ascribe some meaning to the term "scienter" as 
used herein. There is a substantial amount of Lewis G. Carroll's 
Humpty-Dumpty in all of us.7 Everyone-especially appellate court 
judges and contributors to legal periodicals-has the tendency to define 
terms arbitrarily. As a result, numerous definitions have been given 
the term "scienter" as used in connection with fraud. As Professor Loss 
has observed: 
[Scienter] ... has been variously defined to mean everything from 
knowing falsity with an implication of mens rea, through the various 
gradations of recklessness, down to such non-action as is virtually 
equivalent to negligence or even liability without fault .... 8 
In an effort to avoid succumbing to the Humpty-Dumpty syndrome, 
scienter shall here be defined by illustration rather than in the abstract. 
Dean Keeton has isolated the several possible states of mind of a 
party making a misstatement into five more or less separate classes : a 
person makes a misrepresenation ( 1) justifiably convinced of the truth 
of the statement, or (2) believing in the truth of the statement but 
knowing that he has insufficient knowledge on which to base such a 
belief, or ( 3) having no genuine belief whatsoever in either the truth or 
the falsity of the statement, or ( 4) realizing that the statement was 
probably false, or (5) convinced of the falsity of the statement.9 For 
Bromberg has stated: "[T]he typical lOb-5 'victory' is only a holding that a 
cause of action has been stated, good enough to withstand a motion to dismiss." 
A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 1.3(2) (1967) [hereinafter cited as 
BROMBERG]. 
0 Professor Hamilton is much more emphatic on this point: "The case law 
arising under Rule lOb-5 is in a chaotic mess." Hamilton, Book Review, 46 TEXAS 
L. REv. 815 (1968). 
7 
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it 
means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." L. CARROLL, ALICE'S 
ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND TRROUGR TRE LOOKING GLASS 186 (1916). 
8 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1432 (Zd ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as 
Loss]. 
° Keeton, Fratid: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 
583>, 589 (1958). 
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purposes of this paper "intentional" describes Class Five; the term 
"scienter" encompasses Classes Three, Four, and Five. Class Two is 
"negligence," and Class One is "innocent." 
II. CASES CONSIDERING ScrnNTER IN lOb-5 ACTIONS 
Since the courts "created" the private action under rule lOb-510 and 
extended this remedy to buyers as well as sellers, 11 it seems only proper 
to look first to judicial interpretation in deciding the role of scienter in a 
private action under the Rule. The necessity of proof of scienter in a 
private action under rule lOb-5 was first discussed in Fischman v. Ratheon 
Manufacturing Co.12 There the common stockholder-plaintiffs alleged 
that they were induced to purchase stock in the defendant corporation 
by misstatements and omissions in a prospectus that covered only pre-
ferred stock. Relief was sought under section lO(b) and rule lOb-5. The 
trial court dismissed, holding that since the buyers' action was based 
on allegedly false statements in a prospectus, section 11 of the Securities 
Act of 1933 constituted their exclusive remedy. Since relief under 
section 11 is limited to those purchasing the stock issue covered by the 
prospectus, it was held that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of 
action.13 The Second Circuit reversed, stating : "[W] hen, to conduct 
actionable under § 11 of the 1933 Act, there is added the ingredient of 
fraud, then the conduct becomes actionable under § lOb of the 1934 Act 
and the Rule .... "14 The remainder of the opinion affords no guidance 
as to the meaning of the phrase "ingredient of fraud." 
In Weber v. C.M.P. C orp.,15 a district court defined this phrase as 
meaning "knowledge of the falsity of the alleged untrue statements.nio 
The definition is consistent with the interpretation attributed to Fischman 
by most courts and legal writers and with the present day concept of 
1° Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See 
generally Dykstra, Civit Liability Under R1tle 10b-5, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 207, 
209-11. 
11 See Fischman v. Ratheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786-88 (2d Cir. 1951) ; 
BROMBERG § 2.4(2) j 3 Loss 7778-91. 
iii 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). 
18 Fischman v. Ratheon Mfg. Co., 9 F.R.D. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). The court 
made mention of section 12(2) of the 1933 Act but seems to have ignored its 
availability. 
"188 F.2d at 787 (emphasis added). 
16 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The court went on to question, but none-
theless to follow, the Fischman formulation. 
10 Id. at 323. 
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the term "fraud."17 Although cases allowing recovery for negligent 
misrepresentation are sometimes referred to as "fraud" cases,18 the pre-
vailing view is that they are grounded in a theory of recovery separate 
and distinct from fraud.19 
Fischman has received little judicial acceptance. While several 
New York district court decisions have followed it,20 only one court out-
side the Second Circuit, the district court of Colorado, can be said 
to have taken a similar position. In Trussell v. United Underwriters> 
Ltd.,21 the plaintiffs were stock purchasers seeking damages from the 
defendant seller-issuer. The complaint contained five counts, three of 
which charged misrepresentations and omissions in violation of rule 
lOb-5. Of these three, the first merely itemized the misstatements; the 
second incorporated the first and added the allegation that the defendants 
had full knowledge of the falsity of the representations and of the fact 
that plaintiffs would rely upon them; and the third22 charged that the 
statements constituted negligent performance by the defendants of their 
duty to disclose full, complete, and accurate information. The first and 
third counts were dismissed by the district court as insufficient in that 
they contained no allegation that the misstatements were made knowingly 
or intentionally.23 In dictum, the court explained its concept of knowingly 
or intentionally as including a representation made with reckless dis-
regard of the truth or falsity.24 
17 See, e.g., R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND 
MATERIALS 866-67 (2d ed. 1968); Comment, Seciirities Regulatio~Fraud in 
Secitrities Transactions and Ritle 10b-5-A S1trvey of Selected C1irrent Problems, 
46 N.C.L. REv. 599, 623-25 (1968). But see E. GADSBY, FEDERAL SECURITIES 
Acr OF 1934 § 5.03[1] [d] (1967). 
18 E.g., Bobby Jones Garden Apts., Inc. v. Suleski, 391 F.2d 172, 177 (5th Cir. 
1968), quoting from Kutner v. Kalish, 173 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). 
10 See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS§ 102, at 720 (3d ed. 1964). 
••See Globus v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 197-98 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968) (something more than a negligent misstatement); Gould v. Tricon, Inc., 
272 F. Supp. 385, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (proof of fraudulent conduct essential); 
Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (intent to 
defraud or guilty knowledge) (dictum); Webber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321, 
325 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (deception in the sense of cheating). 
21 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964). 
•• This was actually the plaintiffs' fourth claim; their third claim alleged viola-
tion of the state blue sky law. For a discussion of the problem of pendent juris-
diction posed by this claim, see 40 WASH. L. REv. 3'52 (1965). 
•
3 228 F. Supp. at 773-74. 
•&Id. at 772. Accordingly, it would seem that in Colorado, as well as in states 
within the Second Circuit, only misrepresentations made with a state of mind 
coming within Classes Three, Four, or Five of Dean Keeton's classification of 
misstatements would give rise to private actions under rule lOb-5. 
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The precedential value of Trussell today is somewhat questionable. In 
Stevens v. Vowell,25 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which 
includes Colorado, stated : 
It is not necessary to allege or prove common law fraud to make out 
a case under the statute and rule. It is only necessary to prove one 
of the prohibited actions such as the material misstatement of fact or 
the omission to state a material fact.26 
Then in Parker v. Baltimore Paint & Chemical Corp.,21 the Colorado 
district court found the above language to be dictum and reaffirmed the 
requirement for scienter imposed by Trussell.28 The facts of Stevens give 
support to this finding. There the defendants had represented that the 
entire amount of the investment would be used for the construction of 
Arro-Triever archery lanes in Utah; the defendants in fact had no con-
nection with the actual owner of Arro-Triever and no such lanes were 
ever built. These facts permit at least in inference of fraud, and the 
plaintiff's complaint so alleged. 
There is also a line of cases supporting the position that scienter is 
not required by rule lOb-5; the leading one is Ellis v. Carter.29 In it, as 
in Fischman, a buyer sought to recover for allegedly frau'<iulent mis-
representations under rule lOb-5. As in Fischman, the defendants con-
tended that rule lOb-5 affords no right of recovery to defrauded buyers, 
and the contention was rejected by the court.30 But unlike the Second 
Circuit, the court in Ellis, in rejecting this contention, stated that a show-
ing of common law fraud is not essential to the establishment of a cause 
of action under lOb-5.31 There is language in the opinion indicating that 
even innocent misrepresentations may be a basis for recovery under the 
Rule,32 and Ellis has been read in such a manner by several legal writers.83 
No court has actually held that liability will attach for a misrepresentation 
that is neither negligent nor intentional although there is language in sev-
eral cases other than Ellis that would seem to support such a holding.84 
25 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965). 
••Id. at 379. 
•
7 244 F. Supp. 267 (D. Colo. 1965). 
•
9 Id. at 270. 
•• 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). 
80 Id. at 273-74. 
81 Id. at 275 n.5. 
""Id. at274. 
88 See BROMBERG § 8.9 n.102; R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, stepra note 17, at 866-
67. 
8
' E.g., Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962) ; 
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Ellis has received as little judicial recognition as Fischman. While 
several courts have indicated by means of dictum their approval of 
the position on scienter taken in Ellis,35 only one district court can be said 
to have based a decision on that case. In Hendricks v. Flato Realty 
Investments,36 a federal district court relied on Ellis to reject a motion 
to dismiss an action for alleged misrepresentations in the sale of securities 
based on rule lOb-5 even though the complaint failed to allege scienter. 
The decision contains no discussion of the reasons for following Ellis; 
the court simply stated: "This court feels that the logical approach of 
Ellis has much to be recommended in a situation of this nature and I am 
persuaded to follow it."37 
In Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co.,38 an Illinois district court took 
still a third position. Plaintiff Drake alleged that he had purchased stock 
in reliance on false figures in Thor's financial statements and that de-
fendant accounting firm had failed to exercise proper and appropriate 
auditing procedures in examining the financial statements and in rendering 
its opinion that the statements fairly represented the financial position of 
Thor. No charge having been made that it knew of the alleged mis-
representations in the financial statements, defendant accounting firm, 
contending inter alia that knowledge is a necessary element of a claim 
under rule lOb-5,39 moved to dismiss. The court rejected both the 
rationale of Ellis40 and the defendant's contention and construed the 
allegation of improper auditing procedures as an allegation of negli-
gence.41 The court held that negligent as well as intentional misrepre-
sentations are within the ambit of rule lOb-5.42 
This position was apparently adopted by the majority in SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.43 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14, 23 (W.D. 
Ky. 1960), rev'd on other groimds sub noni., Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962). 
85 Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 
U.S. 951 (1968); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379-80 (10th Cir. 1965); 
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963). 
80 [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCR FED. SEC. L. REP. if 92,290 (S.D. Tex. 
1968). 
21 Id. V 92,290 at 97,388. 
as 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967). 
"
0 Brief for Defendant, Peat, Manvick, Mitchell & Co., at 8, Drake v. Thor 
Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967). 
'
0 282 F. Supp. at 102. 
41 Id. at 104. 
•
2 Id. at 105. 
•
2 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 ( 1969). 
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in deciding this case cited both Fischman and Ellis in support of the 
proposition that negligent misrepresentations or omissions are actionable 
under rule lOb-5 : 
In an enforcement proceeding for equitable or prophylactic relief, the 
common law standard of deceptive conduct has been modified in 
the interests of broader protection for the investing public so that 
negligent insider conduct has become unlawful. A similar standard has 
been adopted in private actions . . . 
. . . [T]his position is not ... irreconcilable with previous language 
in this circuit because "some form of the traditional sci enter require-
ment" ... Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., ... is preserved. This 
requirement, whether it be termed lack of diligence, constructive fraud, 
or unreasonable or negligent conduct, remains implicit in this standard, 
a standard that promotes the deterrence objective of the Rule.44 
As the above discussion indicates, this interpretation is at best a some-
what loose reading of Ellis and Fischman. To compound the confusion, 
the majority later in its opinion indicated that good faith will be a 
defense to a private action instituted under rule lOb-5 for misrepresentation 
in the purchase or sale of securities : 
It seems clear, however, that if corporate management demonstrates 
that it was diligent in ascertaining that the information it published 
was the whole truth and that such diligently obtained information 
was disseminated in good faith, rule 10b-5 would not have been 
violated.45 
Further, the concurring opinions express reservations about imposing 
civil liability for negligence.46 
Coupling these observations with the fact that Te:cas Gulf Sielplner 
involved governmental enforcement rather than a private action, it ·seems 
clear that the decision affords no real answer to the scienter question. 
This conclusion is borne out by the subsequent decisions that contain 
discussions of the language of Te:cas Gulf Sulphur. The majority of 
the courts in these cases recognize scienter as an element in a private 
action under the Rule, but are not specific as to the degree of scienter.47 
•~ Id. at 854-55. 
'" Id. at 862. 
••Id. at 866, 868, 869. 
"See, e.g., Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969) ; 
Ruszkowski v. Hugh Johnson & Co., Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D.N.Y. 1969); 
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The following excerpt from Astor v. Texas Gu.lf Sulphur48 is repre-
sentative: 
While some degree of scienter is required, "the trend is clearly 
away from enforcing a scienter requirement equal to the 'intent to 
defraud' required for common law fraud." Globus v. Law Research 
Service [418 F.2d at 1291]. What degree is necessary, whether 
it is "actual knowledge of falsity," Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 
914 (2d Cir. 1968), or "recklessness ... equivalent to wilful fraud," 
S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, ... is not entirely clear. Until the 
"great debate over ordinary negligence versus scienter in private 
actions under lO(b) and Rule lOb-5," Globus v. Law Research Ser-
vice [418 F.2d at 1291], is resolved, this court will adhere to the most 
recent views expressed by this Circuit, that plaintiffs must show more 
than that the April 12 press release was negligently prepared. They 
must show some degree of scienter.49 
Professor Bromberg has stated the view that the trend in case law 
is very much against requiring scienter in a private action under rule 
lOb-5 ;50 a writer in the North Carolina Law Review has observed a con-
trary development taking place.51 With due respect to both, it seems in-
accurate to view these few decisions as representing any sort of trend. In 
most circuits, the necessity of alleging and proving a particular state of 
mind in a rule lOb-5 action has not even been discussed by way of dictum. 
Thus, as Professors Jennings and Marsh have observed, any trend as 
to the necessity of proving scienter in a lOb-5 action "would appear to be 
largely in the eye of the beholder."52 
Legal writers are as divided on the question of what the "law" should 
be53 as they are on the question of what the present state of the law is. 
To mention but a few of the ideas that have recently appeared: Professor 
Gerstel v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). But cf. 
Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11" 92,494 (D. Utah 
Oct. 17, 1969) (civil liability imposed with no discussion of elements of private 
action). 
'" 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
'
0 Id. at 1343-44. 
oo BROMBERG § 2.6(1). 
•
1 Comment, Securities Reg11lation---Frmui in Sewrities Transactions and R'llle 
10b-5-A S11rvey of Selected C1irrent Problems, 46 N.C.L. REv. 599, 625 (1968). 
•• R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 17, at 866-67 n.6. 
•• The shorthand phrase "what the 'law' should be" is perhaps misleading. Many 
legal commentators favor the replacement of lOb-5 with a comprehensive provision 
for civil liability. See Henkel, Codification-Civil Liability Under the Federal 
Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAWYER, 866 (1967). The views surveyed in the text, 
however, refer to the role of scienter in rule lOb-5 in its present form. 
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Meisenholder advocates requiring scienter ;54 Professor Jennings agrees 
except when plaintiff and defendant were in a fiduciary-type relation-
ship ;55 Professor Loss would require at least "watered down scienter" ;0B 
Professor Israels would extend liability to include negligent misrepre-
sentation ;57 and most recently Professor Ruder has proposed a variable 
standard of state of mind dependent upon privity, trading, and whether 
the gravamen of the complaint is misrepresentation or merely nondis-
closure. 58 
As the cases and commentators provide no clear answer to the role 
of scienter in private actions under rule lOb-5, it is necessary to examine 
the Rule in light of recognized constructional principles. 
III. CONSTRUCTIONAL ARGUMENTS 
The construction of a statute or rule is, at best, an ine.."i:act art. 
Professor Newman has stated: 
[T]he cases lack consistency. The Court at times stresses words; at 
times, intent. Maxims of construction compete with considerations 
of policy. . . . The issues have been so scattered that we cannot even 
detect trends. 59 
There is, however, agreement that the initial step in the constructional 
process is an examination of the language of the rule itself. Bo 
A. Language of the Rule 
Professor Painter has observed that " [ t] he fertility of rule lOb-5 
lies in its potential to prohibit as much as possible while saying as little 
"' Meisenholder, Scienter and Reliance as Elements in B11yer's S11it Against 
Seller Under R1de 10B-S, 4 CORP. PRAc. COMM. 27 (Feb. 1963). Accord, M. Katz 
& D. Schwartz, Civil Liability Under R11le 10b-S, in PLI, SEC PROBLEMS (1967); 
Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in a, Private S1tit Under SEC Anti-Frattd R11le 
10b-5, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1070 (1965). 
••Jennings, Insider Trading in Corporate Sec11rities: A S11rvey of Hazards 
and Disclosttre Obligations Under R11le 10b-S, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 809, 818 (1968). 
•
0 3 Loss 1766. Accord, Comment, Secttrities Reg11lation: Shareholder Deriva-
tive Actions Against Insiders Under R11le 10b-S, 1966 DuKE L.J. 166, 171-72; 
Comment, Private Remedies Available Under Rule 10b-S, 20 Sw. L.J. 620, 621 
(1966). 
•
7 Israels, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J. 1585, 1593 (1968). Accord, Comment, 
Negligent Misrepresentations Under R11le 10b-S, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 824 (1965). 
••Ruder, Texas G11lf S11lph11r-The Second Romid: Privity and State of Mind 
in R11le 10b-S Pttrchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423, 444 n.107 (1969). 
••Newman, How C01trts Interpret Reg1elations, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 509, 522 
(1947). 
00 See generally E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES§ 164 (1940). 
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as possible."61 The Rule makes no mention of scienter. It provides that 
it shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly by use of inter-
state commerce, the mails, or the facilities of a national securities ex-
change: 
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or 
( c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person .... 62 
The phrase "to defraud" in clause (a) implies a requirement of sci-
enter. 63 "[O]perate as a fraud or deceit upon any person" in clause (c) 
can be similarly read.64 There is, however, no language in clause (b) 
that gives rise to even an implication that scienter may be required. 
Because of this interpretation, several legal writers have taken the position 
that the scienter requirement differs from clause to clause-that it is 
required under clauses (a) and ( c), but not under clause (b). 65 For this 
suggestion to have any practical significance, it is necessary that clause 
(b) operate in an area separate and distinct from that of clauses (a) and 
(c). 
The Securities and Exchange Commission regards the ,clauses as 
"mutually supporting rather than mutually exclusive."66 Similarly, most 
courts and commentators have made no effort to distinguish the clauses. 67 
01 Painter, Book Review, 21 VAND. L. REV. 612 (1968). 
0
• 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1969). 
68 See Trussell v. United Undenvriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 770 (D. Colo. 
1964). 
0~ W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 230 (1968) ; 82 
HARV. L. REv. 938, 947 (1969). But see Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations 
Under R1tle 10b-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 824, 826 (1965) ("'operate as a fraud' em-
phasizes the effect of the conduct rather than the actor's state of mind.") 
00 See, e.g., Groff, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf S11lphur 
-Confidential Information and Insider Trading-Rule 10b-5 Emerges into the 
Spotlight, 1966 CORP. COUNSEL ANN. 242, 252; Note, R1de 10b-5: Elements of a 
Private Right of Action, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 541, 549, 561 (1968). 
6
° Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913i (1961). 
67 E.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
382 U.S. 811 (1965) ; Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th 
Cir. 1962) (by implication); Comment, Securities Reg11lation--Fra11-d in Securities 
Transactions and R1tle 10b-5-A S1irvey of Selected C1trrent Problems, 46 N.C.L. 
REv. 599, 623-25 (1968); Comment, Private Remedies Available Under Ritle 10b-5, 
20 Sw. L.J. 620, 621 (1966). 
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A writer in the University of Chicago Law Review, however, has sug-
gested that since clause (b) speaks more directly to active misrepresenta-
tions, "it should be the principal enforcement clause for such conduct."68 
No court has taken this position, and no reported decision contains any 
attempt to distinguish the types of conduct covered only by clause (b). 00 
On the contrary, in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 70 the 
Supreme Court took the opposite view in construing the anti-fraud pro-
vision of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 71 which is worded virtually 
the same as clauses (a) and (c) of rule lOb-5. Noting the omission of 
a counterpart to clause (b), the Court found that fact to have no 
practcial significance72 and labelled "a specific proscription against non-
disclosure surplusage. ma 
Thus, it would seem that the following conclusions can be drawn from 
considering the language of rule lOb-5 : ( 1) the scienter requirement 
should be the same for each of the clauses of rule lOb-5, and (2) while 
the Rule is ambiguous, there is language that can be construed as re-
quiring some form of scienter. 
B. Language of Section 10b 
To be valid, an administrative regulation must be within the ambit 
of the enabling statute.74 Section lOb of the Securities Exchange Act7G 
authorizes rules and regulations proscribing "any manipulative or de-
ceptive device." Professor Loss has suggested that this language may 
limit the Securities and Exchange Commission's authority under section 
lOb to the promulgation of rules requiring scienter and that if rule lOb-5 
is not so limited, it is ultra vi res. 76 There is case law supporting this 
proposition ;77 however, there is also contrary authority. 
68 Comment, Negligent Misrepresenatations Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 824, 826 (1965). Cf. Daum & Phillips, The Implications of Cady, Roberts, 
17 Bus. LAWYER 939, 944-45 (1962). 
69 Some courts have, however, suggested that total silence may violate only 
clauses (a) and (c). See, e.g., Trussell v. United Undenvriters, Ltd., 228 F. 
Supp. 757, 767 (D. Colo. 1964) ; Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 
243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). Accord, 3 Loss 1439. 
•• 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
71 15 u.s.c. § 80b-6(1), (2) (1964). 
•• 3'75 U.S. at 197-99. 
'"Id. at 199. 
·~Yarborough v. Gardner, 283 F. Supp. 814, 821 n.6 (E.D.N.C. 1968). 
7
G 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1964), 
•• 3 Loss 1766. Accord, 82 HARV. L. REv. 938, 947 (1969). 
"E.g., Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 n.12. (S.D.N.Y. 1967); 
Trussell v. United Undenvriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 772 (D. Colo. 1964). 
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In rejecting the proposition, the court in Ellis v. Carter78 emphasized 
the word "any": 
We see no reason to go beyond the plain meaning of the word 'any,' 
indicating that the use of manipulative or deceptive devices or con-
trivances of whatever kind may be forbidden, to construe the statute 
as if it read 'any fraudulent' devices.79 
This reasoning is at best questionable. Granted that "any" manipulative 
or deceptive device means manipulative or deceptive devices of whate"."er 
kind, 80 the question remains whether every kind of manipulative or decep-
tive device requires scienter. 
Professor Meisenholder has reached the same result as the court in 
Ellis in a more logical manner by focusing on the word "deceptive" and 
defining it to include "misrepresentations and omissions of material facts 
which are misleading, no matter how innocently made."81 Similarly, a 
California appellate court in People v. Wahl,82 in construing a statute pro-
hibiting "deceptive or misleading [advertising],"83 replied on a dictionary 
definition-"deceptive does not always imply intent to deceive"84-to find 
no scienter requirement. A writer in the Yale Law Journal has taken the 
position that the omission from section lOb of any specific language 
requiring intent indicates that conduct may be manipulative or deceptive 
without being intentional.85 
Both lines of authority have ignored a relevant consideration-the 
similar language in section 15 ( c) ( 1) 86 of the same Act. This subsection 
prohibits brokers or dealers from effecting transactions "by means of a 
manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance." The 
word "other" is the key. Such a use of "other" in a statute means that 
•s 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). 
'
0 Id. at 274. 
80 B1tt see Donohue v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 155 Conn. 550, 556, 235 A.2d 
643, 646 (1967) ("any" does not necessarily mean "all" or "every"). 
81 Meisenholder, s1tpra note 54, at 37. Cf. Leaven, The Texas G11lf S11lph1tr 
Opinion fa the Appellate Court: An Open Door to Federal Control of Corporations, 
3 GA. L. REV. 141, 159 (1968). 
82 39 Cal. App. 2d 771, 100 P.2d 550 (L.A. County Super. Ct., App. Dept. 1940). 
83 Ch. 254, § 1, [1905] Cal. Stat. 227, as amended, ch. 634, § 1, [1915] Cal. Stat. 
1027 (repealed 1941). 
8
' 39 Cal. App. 2d at 772, 100 P.2d at 551, quoting WEBSTER'S NEw INTER-
NATIONAL DICTIONARY (1938). Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
omits any such mention. 
85 Note, Civil Liability Under Section 10b-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the 
Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 683 (1965). 
80 15 U.S.C. 78o(c) (1) (1964). 
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the words preceding it are of the same character as the words following 
it.87 Thus, "other" indicates that "manipulative" and "deceptive" come 
within the meaning of "fraudulent," and, as pointed out above, "fraudu-
lent" is generally regarded as requiring scienter.88 
It is a well-recognized principle of statutory construction that when 
the same word is used in different parts of the same statute, it will be 
presumed to be used in the same sense in each place, at least in the 
absence of anything in the statute indicating a contrary intent. 80 Accord-
ingly, if 'deceptive" is synonymous with "fraudulent" in section 15, it 
should be synonymous with "fraudulent" in section 10. 
The language of section 20c of the Investment Advisers Act00 may 
also be relevant. It prohibits conduct that is "fraudulent, deceptive or 
manipulative." The use of the disjunctive pronoun "or" seems to indi-
cate that "manipulative" and "deceptive" are different from "fraudu-
lent."91 The Supreme Court, however, has taken a contrary position; 
in construing this provision, the Court said that "manipulative" is no 
broader than "fraudulent."02 
C. Statuory Tort-"Willfully" 
In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,93 the first case to recognize civil 
liability under rule lOb-5, the court relied in part on the statutory tort 
theory.94 Under this theory, the violation of a criminal statute results 
in civil liability. Rule lOb-5 is not itself a criminal statute; nor is section 
lOb. There are no provisions for criminal sanctions in either. Section 3zou 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, however, does make criminal any 
willful violation of any section of the Act or of any rule promulgated 
thereunder. Accordingly, a willful violation of rule lOb-5 is a criminal 
offense and civil liability can be implied therefrom. 06 
81 E.g., In re Bush Terminal Co., 93 F.2d 659, 660 (2d Cir. 1938) ; Twin Falls 
County v. Hulbert, 66 Idaho 128, 140, 156 P.2d 319, 324 (1945). 
88 See pp. 484-85 & note 19 siipra. 
89 E.g., United States v. Gertz, 249 F.2d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Arizona 
State Tax Comm'n v. Staggs Realty Corp., 85 Ariz. 294, 298, 337 P.2d 281, 284 
(1959) (dictum). 
00 15 U.S.C. § SOb-6(4) (1964). 
01 Bitt see E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 188 (1940) ("or" 
may mean "and"). 
92 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). 
93 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
0
' See generally Note, Implying Civil Remedies fro11i Federal Regitlatory 
Statittes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285 (1963). 
95 48 Stat. 904 ( 1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78ff (a) ( 1964). 
96 The statutory tort theory is generally used to establish breach of duty in a 
1970] SCIENTER AND RULE 10b-5 495 
Based on this analysis, it can be argued that civil liability exists only 
for willful violations of lOb-5 and that the violation is willful only when 
the violator acts with scienter. Such an argument ignores the other basis 
for civil liability set out in Kardon ;91 more important for present pur-
poses, it ignores the variety of meanings that have been attributed to 
the word "willful." While the majority of courts still define "willful" in 
terms such as "with evil intent or malice" or "bad purpose,"98 there are 
courts that speak of "willful" as meaning "careless disregard"99 or "reck-
less disregard for the safety of others.moo 
Even within the limits of the federal securities laws, the meaning of 
the word "willful" is far from clear.101 In the very same sentence of 
section 32 that contains the word "willfully," the phrase "willfully and 
knowingly" appears. This fact would seem to indicate that "willfully'' 
as used in section 32 means something different from, and less than, 
"knowingly." Further, while there has been no reasoned discussion of 
"'willfully'' under section 32, the courts have been liberal in construing 
this term in cases arising under other sections of the Securities Acts. In 
United States v. Benjamin,102 for example, the Second Circuit indicated 
that the defendant acted willfully, within the meaning of section 24 of the 
Securities Act of 1933, when he "recklessly stated as facts things of which 
be was ignorant."103 It would thus seem that the Second Circuit would 
1abel the actions of a defendant that fall within Class Three of Dean 
negligence action. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTS § 35 (3d ed. 1964). The prin-
.ciple is, however, by no means so limited. See Joseph, Civil Liability Under 
R1tle 10b-5-A Reply, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 171, 172-74 (1964). But cf. Ruder, 
Civil Liability Utuler R1tle 10b-S: hulicial Revision of Legislative Intent!, 57 Nw. 
U.L. REv. 627, 631-35 (1963). 
01 The court in Kardon also relied on contractual voidability under section 
:29(b), which provides that contracts in violation of any section of the Act shall 
"be void. The court said: "[A] statutory enactment that a contract of a certain kind 
:shall be void almost necessarily implies a remedy in respect of it." 69 F .Supp. at 
.514. Private actions can be grounded on this contractual theory only if the parties 
:are in privity. Cf. 3 Loss 1759. 
08 E.g., Chow Bing Kew v. United States, 248 F.2d 466, 471 (9th Cir.), cert. 
de1iied, 355 U.S. 889 (1957) ; Shields v. State, 184 Okla. 618, 620-22, 89 P.2d 
756, 760-61 (1939). 
00 Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 420 (2d Cir. 1961). The court also recog-
:nized that "willful" would embrace "an act done with a bad purpose." Id. 
10
° Kelly v. Burtner, 310 Ill. App. 251, 256, 33' N.E.2d 754, 757 (1941). 
101 See generally 2 Loss 1307-12; 5 Id. 3367-78 (1969). 
102 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964). 
108 328 F.2d at 862. Alternatively, the court said: "[T]he government can meet 
its burden by proving that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to facts he had 
:a duty to see • • •• " Id. 
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Keeton's categories104 as "willful." Other courts have gone even further, 
bringing negligent misrepresentations within the term "willfully." Both 
the Sixth105 and Seventh Circuits106 have held that the willfulness re-
quirement of the Securities Act is satisfied by proof that the defendant 
made representations that due diligence would have shown to be un-
true. This interpretation has led Professor Ruder to state that "this 
burden [proof of willfulness] will easily be metmo7 and a student author 
to write that "willfulness might be simply an alternative way of de-
scribing a negligence standard."108 
D. Legislative and Administrative History 
It is common when construing a statute that is ambiguous on its 
face to refer to legislative history as an aid in determining legislative 
intent.109 Although a number of courts, faced with questions concerning 
the role of scienter in a private action under lOb-5, have discussed the 
legislative history of section !Ob and rule lOb-5,110 none has found any 
guidance. In enacting section !Ob, Congress did not consider the possi-
bility of private actions being maintained thereunder, much less the ele-
ments of such actions. Section !Ob was enacted to give the newly created 
Securities and Exchange Commission the power to regulate manipulative 
practices so as to avoid loopholes in the law.111 At the time of its enact-
ment, the provision was generally regarded as of little significance. 
Similarly, the history of rule lOb-5 affords little insight. It too was 
designed for use by the Securities and Exchange Commission, rather 
than as a basis for private recovery. In fact, the Commission in drafting 
10
' With respect to this and subsequent references Dean Keeton's five classes 
of misrepresentation, see pp. 483-84 sitpra. 
106 See Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70, 75 (6th Cir. 1940). 
100 See United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
370 U.S. 917 (1962), quoting Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70, 75 (6th Cir. 
1940). 
107 Ruder, supra note 96, at 678 n.23'1. 
10
• Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Ri1le 10b-S, 32 U. Cm. L. 
REv. 824, 838 (1965). 
100 See generally 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 481-507 (3d 
ed. 1943). 
110 See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Trussell v. United 
Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964). 
111 S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934). See Hearings 01i H.R. 7852 
and H.R. 872~ (Stock Exchange Regielation) Before the Hoitse Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (testimony of Thomas 
G. Corcoran). 
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and adopting rule lOb-5 was motivated by a specific incident-a corporate 
officer was intentionally spreading erroneous harmful information about 
his company so that he could purchase its outstanding stock at a greatly 
reduced price. In the words of the Rule's draftsman: 
... I looked at Section lO(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put 
them together, and the only discussion we had there was where "in 
connection with the purchase or sale" should be . . . . 
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar . . . . All 
the commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on the table, indi-
cating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike who 
said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?" That is 
how it happened.112 
There was again little recognition of the significance of the action.113 
In a release issued on the day of adoption, the SEC explained the pur-
pose and scope of the Rule as follows : 
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the 
adoption of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection with 
the purchase of securities. The previously existing rules against fraud 
in the purchase of securities applied only to brokers and dealers. The 
new rule closes a loophole in the protections against fraud administered 
by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying 
securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase .... 114 
Perhaps some significance can be attributed to the use of the word "fraud" 
by both Commissioner Pike and the writer of the press release.115 While 
there is again the question of what is meant by "fraud," this phraseology 
would seem to indicate that the Commission viewed rule lOb-5 as apply-
ing to, at most, misrepresentations within Classes Three, Four, and Five. 
It is well to remember, however, that these observations were directed 
to governmental use of the Rule.116 
m Freeman, Administrative Procediwes, 22 Bus. LAWYER 891, 922 (1967). 
11
• See BROMBERG § 2.2; Manne, fo Defense of Insider Trading, 44 HARV. Bus. 
REV. 113, 121 (Nov.-Dec. 1966). 
m SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). 
11
• The word "fraud" was also used in connection with rule lOb-5 in the Annual 
Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission for the year of the Rule's 
adoption. 8 SEC ANN. REP. 10 (1942). 
110 See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 39'5 U.S. 180, 193 
(1963); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 914-15 (1961); Bromberg, Insider 
Purchases, Sales and Tips, in PLI, TEXAS GULF SULPHUR-DISCLOSURES & IN-
SIDERS 73 (1968). 
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E. Significance of Other Sections of the Securities Acts 
Still another cardinal rule of statutory construction is that an inter-
pretation making every section operative is favored over one that makes 
some sections duplicative or unnecessary.117 There are several provisions 
in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
aside from section lOb and rule lOb-5, that provide for or have been read 
to provide for civil liability; there are also express statutory limitations 
on actions brought under these sections.118 Consequently, it can be argued 
that unless these limitations are read into lOb-5 or unless liability under 
the Rule is limited to intentional misrepresentations, these sections will 
become surplusage since the plaintiff will always proceed under rule 
lOb-5 to avoid the limitations. To appreciate this contention fully, it 
becomes necessary to examine the sections referred to. 
The Securities Act119 contains three sections that expressly provide 
buyers of securities with a civil remedy for misrepresentation, and a fourth 
that has been so read. Section 11120 imposes liability on "almost anyone 
who had anything to do with a new issuem21 for false statements or 
omissions in the prospectus. Neither sci enter nor negligence is necessary 
for the plaintiff's prima facie case under section 11; he need simply estab-
lish that he acquired securities whose registration statement contained a 
material misstatement or omission. State of mind, however, may be 
important to the defendant. Unless he is an issuer, he may avoid liability 
for the "unexpertized" portion of the registration statement122 by estab-
m [W]here the statute in question expressly created a private cause 0£ 
action, the implied cause ... must square with legislative intent at least to 
the extent that the implied private cause of action does not have aspects in-
consistent with those provided in connection with the express cause. 
Leavell, S1tpra note 81, at 156. 
118 See generally Simpson, Investors' Civil Remedies Under the Federal Sec11ri-
ties Laws, 12 DEPAUL L. REv. 71 (1962). 
110 An analysis of the Securities Act of 1933 is in order since the Securities Act 
and the Securities Exchange Act are generally regarded as being in pari materia. 
See, e.g., 3 Loss 1781; Note, Seciirities Acts-Sec1trities Act of 1933-Bityer 
Relying on Misleading Prospectits May Recover Pimitive Damages; Grossly 
Negligent Underwriter Cannot Enforce Indemnificati01i Agreement Against Issieer, 
82 HARV. L. REv. 951, 954-59 (1969). 
120 15 u.s.c. § 77k (1964). 
121 Note, The Prospects for Rule X-10B-S: An Emerging Remedy for Defrattded 
bivestors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1126 (1950). For a more extensive discussion 0£ 
liability under section 11, see Comment, Civil Liability for Misstatements in Docte-
ments Filed U1ider Securities Act mid Securities E~change Act, 44 YALE L.J. 
456, 470-76 (1935). 
120 For the "expertized" portion of the registration statement-that part certi-
fied by an expert such as an accountant-the defendant need establish only that 
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lishing that he had "reasonable ground to believe and did believe" that 
the statement in issue was true or that there was no omission of a material 
fact; the standard of reasonableness is statutorily defined as that required 
of a prudent man in the management of his own property. In terms of 
Dean Keeton's classifications, by bringing himself within Classes One or 
Two, the defendant avoids liability. 
Section 12(2)123 also provides relief for misstatements and omissions, 
but unlike section 11, the misstatements or omissions need not have 
occurred in the registration statement; they may be in any oral communica-
tion or prospectus.124 As with section 11, scienter and negligence are a 
part of the defendant's case; by establishing that he did not know and 
in the exercise of "reasonable care" could not have known of the mis-
representation or omission, the defendant may avoid liability.125 Again, 
by bringing himself within Classes One or Two, the defendant is protected. 
If an action is brought under either section 11 or section 12 (2), the 
court in its discretion may require the plaintiff to post a bond for the 
payment of costs, including attorneys fees, in the event that the suit is 
found to be lacking merit.126 The plaintiff under section 11 or 12 (2) 
must allege facts establishing that the action has been brought within one 
year after the discovery of the omission or after such discovery should 
have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence.127 There are 
also venue limitations on private actions brought under section 11 <?r 
section 12(2); such actions must be instituted in the district in which 
the defendant is found, is an inhabitant, or transacts business or in the 
district in which the sale took place if the defendant participated in it.128 
Section 15129 imposes liability on one who controls, through stock 
"he had no reasonable ground to believe and did not believe . . . that the state-
ments ... were untrue .... " 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964). 
12S 15 u.s.c. § 77l(2) (1964). 
1°' ''Prospectus" is defined in section 2(10) of the Securities Act include virtu-
ally every written communication. 
m The interpretation of this provision affords further illustration of the division 
over the meaning of scienter. Professor Loss has taken the position that scienter is 
"foreign" to section 12(2) while a Michigan notewriter has written: "This lan-
gauge incorporates . . . scienter into a section 12(2) action, but as an affirmative 
defense." Compare 3 Loss 1730 with Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in a 
Private S1tit Under SEC Anti-Frmtd R1tle 10b-5, 63 Mrc:s:. L. REv. 1070, 1074 
(1965). 
126 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964). 
121 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964). But in no event shall an action be allowed more 
than three years after sale or initial offering. 
12
" 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1964). Actions may also be brought in state tribunals. 
120 15 u.s.c. § 770 (1964). 
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ownership, agency, or otherwise, a person liable under section 11 or 12. 
The venue and costs provisions applicable to sections 11 and 12 also 
apply to section 15.130 Again, the defendant has the burden of proving 
his state of mind-proof of "no knowledge of or reasonable ground to 
believe in" the existence of the facts giving rise to the asserted liability 
constitutes a defense. This standard seems more favorable to the de-
fendant than those in sections 11 and 12. In terms of Dean Keeton's 
classifications, only those persons in Classes Four or Five would seem to 
be vulnerable under section 15. 
Some courts have recognized a private right of action in a buyer 
for misrepresentations under section 17.181 Section 17 is worded virtually 
the same as rule lOb-5; the rule was, in effect, copied from it.132 It would 
thus seem that the scienter requirements under section 17 should be the 
same as under rule lOb-5, and several courts have taken this position.183 
Accordingly, there will be no separate discussion of this section. 
Remedies under the Securities Exchange Act, unlike those under the 
Securities Act, are available to both buyers and sellers. Like the Securities 
Act, the Securities Exchange Act contains three sections that expressly 
provide for civil liability for misrepresentation and, again, a fourth that 
has been so read. 
Section 9 of the Act contains a number of specific prohibitions against 
the manipulation of securities registered on a national exchange. One 
such prohibition goes to a false and misleading statement that the mis-
representer "knew or had reasonable grounds to believe was false or 
misleading.m34 This standard seemingly encompasses only Classes Four 
180 There is, however, some question as to the applicable statute of limitations. 
Section 13, the ·limitations provision of the 193'3 Act, speaks only of sections 11 
and 12. It can, however, be argued that since liability under section 15 extends only 
"to the same extent as" liability under sections 11 and 12, section 13 also applies 
to section 15. 
181 E.g., Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Osborne v. 
Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Contra, Trussell v. United Under-
writers, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 769 (D. Colo. 1964). Professor Loss has made 
a telling argument against implying a private action under section 17 by pointing 
out that the Securities Act is replete with express remedies for the same activities. 
3 Loss 1784-90. Nevertheless, this controversy seems of limited practical sig-
nificance in light of the implied private remedy under rule lOb-5. 
182 See p. 497 & note 112 sitpra. 
188 E.g., Fischman v. Ratheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 n.2 (2d Cir. 1951) 
(dictum); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968). 
m15 U.S.C. §78i(a)(4) (1964). 
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and Five ;135 it cannot be said that a person with no knowledge of the 
accuracy or inaccuracy of his statement has reasonable grounds to believe 
that the statement is false. Section 9 ( e), however, limits civil liability 
for violation of the section to persons who "willfully" violate its mandates. 
It could be argued from this limitation that the potential defendants are 
limited to those within Class Five.136 Defenses are available that limit the 
applicability of section 9 even further; not only are there venue and costs 
limitations similar to those under sections 11 and 12 (2) of the Securities 
Act, but there is also a severe causation burden.137 
Section 18138 provides for civil liability for misleading statements of 
material facts in papers filed under the Securities Exchange Act or any 
rule thereunder. As in sections 11 and 12(2) of the~Securities Act, the 
defendant has the burden of proving his state of mind as a defense. A 
defendant in an action under section 18 may avoid liability by establishing 
that he acted in good faith and without knowledge of the falsity or mis-
leading nature of the statement. This standard has been generally con-
sidered as being very favorable to the defendant-much less stringent than, 
for example, section 11 of the 1933 Act.139 Such a view, however, seems 
to focus only on the requirement of knowledge and to ignore the phrase 
"in good faith." Defendants within Classes Three and Four as well as 
those in Class Five are not "in good faith" and accordingly can not 
utilize this defense. 
Section 20140 is the Securities Exchange Act counterpart of section 15 
of the Securities Act; it imposes liability on anyone who controls a 
person liable under any of the provisions of the 1934 Act. The defenses 
available to the defendants, however, are stated in terms different from 
those of section 15-"good faith" as contrasted with "knowledge of or 
reasonable grounds to believe." Although, for reasons mentioned above, 
the former would seem to protect only defendants in Classes One and 
180 Professor Schulman apparently would limit it even further-to Oass Five 
only. In referring to this language in section 9, he has written: "This 'scienter' 
requirement is a strict one and goes far beyond the more modem concepts applied 
in misrepresentation cases." Schulman, Stat1ttes of Limitation in 10b-S Actions: 
Complication Added to Conf1tsion, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 635, 646 (1967). 
100 Compare pp. 494-95 & notes 96-97 supra. 
187 See generally 3 Loss 1748-49. 
188 15 U.S.C. §78r (1964). 
180 3 Loss 1752 ("cousin to scienter"); Comment, Civil LiabiUty for Misstate-
ments in Dornments Filed Under Sec1trities Act and Securities Exchange Act, 44 
YALE L.J. 456, 474 (1935) ("may enable the negligent or even the intentionally 
dishonest director or officer to escape liability entirely''). 
HO 15 U.S.C. §78t (1964). 
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Two and the latter defendants in Classes One through Three, the absence 
of case law under these sections precludes any certainty as to the practical 
differences between the two standards.141 
Civil liability for misrepresentation has been implied from section 
15(c) (1) 142 of the Securities Exchange Act-the anti-fraud provision 
applicable to over-the-counter transactions involving brokers or dealers.143 
Aside from the language limiting it to over-the-counter transactions by 
brokers or dealers, the wording of 15 ( c) ( 1) is markedly similar to that 
of section lOb. In addition, rule 15c(l-2), promulgated under section 
15 ( c) ( 1), defines fraudulent practices in a manner similar in part to 
lOb-5 (b) except that the misstatement must be made "with knowledge 
or reasonable grounds to believe that it is untrue or misleading."144 Un-
like sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities Act and section 18 of the 
Securities Exchange Act, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff; he must 
establish that the defendant comes within Classes Four or Five. 
There is no statutory basis for applying any of the restrictions in 
the above provisions to rule lOb-5.145 One example is the statute of 
limitations.146 While a number of writers have urged that the statute 
of limitations of the Securities Act of 1933 should be implied in private 
actions brought under rule lOb-5,147 no court to date has so held. Such 
a holding would ignore the statutory framework. Rule lOb-5 was promul-
gated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which contains several 
limitations provisions. This fact would seem to preclude application of 
the 1933 Act's limitations to the Rule. On the other hand, the Securities 
Exchange Act's statutes of limitations are also not applicable; they are 
all directed to particular sections of the Act-sections other than section 
lOb. 
m Professor Loss indicates that the standards are different but does not state 
the nature of the difference. 3 Loss 1808. 
m 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1) (1964). 
m See, e.g., Opper v. Hancock Securities Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 673 
(S.D.N.Y.) (dictum), aff'd per ciiriam, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966). See also 
E. GADSBY, FEDERAL SECURITIES ExcHANGE ACT § 5.03(2), at 5-31 (1967). 
1
" "This is a version of scienter .•.. " BROMBERG §2.3, at 23. 
m See Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 824, 836 n.49 (1965). 
m "[T]he main reason for bringing an action under section lOb and Rule 
lOb-5 may be to avoid the relatively short statute of limitations provided for in 
the express civil liability sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts." H. SowARDS, 
SECURITIES REGULATIONS 436 (1966). 
m See BROMBERG § 12.9, at 284; Israels, sttpra note 57, at 1591; Schulman, 
sttpra note 135; Note, Civil Liability Under Section 10B and R1tle 10b-5: A S1tg-
gestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 685-86 (1965). 
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Accordingly, a plaintiff can avoid the obstacles presented by other 
potentially applicable provisions of the Securities Act and the Se-
curities Exchange Act by proceeding under rule lOb-5, and this is 
precisely what plaintiffs are doing.148 Professor Bromberg has approxi-
mated that rule lOb-5 is "generating almost as much litigation as all the 
other general antifraud provisions together, and several times as much 
as the express liabilities,m49 and has stated : 
[Rule lOb-5] is by now such a dominant factor in private securities 
litigation that one is surprised when it does not turn up, and a court 
does not hesitate to introduce it as a major consideration if plaintiff 
fails to plead it.160 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While principles of statutory construction do not definitely establish 
which misrepresentations should be within the ambit of rule lOb-5, they 
do indicate which misrepresentations should not: those innocently made. 
Although actions based on intentional and negligent misrepresentations 
are consistent with the above considerations, actions based on innocent 
misrepresentations are not. 
This conclusion is also supported by the policy underlying the federal 
securities legislation. The probable result of imposing liability under rule 
lOb-5 for innocent misrepresentations would be a drastic reduction of 
information to the public regarding traded securities ; the basic purpose 
of the federal securities laws is to statutorily encourage and increase the 
dissemination of information pertaining to securities.151 Thus it would 
be incongruous to extend rule !Ob-S's coverage to innocent misrepresenta-
tions. 
The question remains, however, whether rule lOb-5 reaches negligent 
as well as intentional misrepresentations-whether Classes Two through 
Five should all be actionable under the Rule. Constructional principles 
do not provide an answer. On balance, they indicate that such a reading of 
rule lOb-5 is permissible; however, they afford no guidance as to the 
policies that support such an interpretation. The desirability of subjecting 
negligent misrepresentations to liability under rule lOb-5 would seem to 
call for consideration by the SEC of the effects of such action on the 
flow of information to the public regarding securities. Attention should 
148 Schulman, szepra note 135, at 644. 
140 BROMBERG § 2.5 ( 6), at 45-46. 
m Id. 46. 
161 See fore Tucker Corp., 26 S.E.C. 249 (1947). The preamble to the Securi-
ties Act reads in part: "To provide full and fair disclosure .... " 
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be given to the quality as well as the quantity of such information. 
Obviously, the easier it is to establish liability for misrepresentations under 
the Rule, the more careful a representer will be in what he states, and the 
higher will be the quality of the information that is disseminated; equally 
obvious, the harder it is to establish liability for misrepresentations, the 
freer will be the flow of information although its quality or accuracy 
may suffer. 
These conflicting goals present a question of policy that the SEC is 
best equipped to handle.152 It is unrealistic to expect a legislative solution 
in the near future.153 The same is true of a judicial solution. Some of 
the federal judicial circuits have yet to consider a private action under 
rule lOb-5; and in SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,164 the Supreme Court 
said: 
Although § lOb and Rule lOb-5 may well be the most litigated pro-
visions in the federal securities laws, this is the first time this Court 
has found it necessary to interpret them. We enter this virgin 
territory cautiously. The questions presented are narrow ones. They 
arise in an area where glib generalizations and unthinking abstractions 
are major occupational hazards. Accordingly, in deciding this par-
ticular case, remembering what is not involved is as important as 
determining what is.155 
Heeding the Court's admonition, no further "glib generalizations" 
will be made. Rather, SEC action in this area is again urged. As 
one of the nation's leading securities lawyers has observed: "[I]f the 
law were clearer and lOb-5 had been written out in some kind of a specific 
regulation and I think it is possible-I don't think Texas Gulf could 
have happened."156 
m See generally 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.05 (1958). 
B1tt cf. Ruder, Texas G1tlf S1tlphur-The Second Romtd: Privity a1td State of 
Mi1td in R11le 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63' Nw. U.L. REV. 423, 450 (1968) 
("each case involves separate considerations which no longer lend themselves to 
sweeping statements regarding the elements required for imposition of liability 
under Rule lOb-5"). 
m See e.g., Demmler, Codification, 22 Bus. LAWYER 832, 840 (1967); Israels, 
supra note 57. It should be noted that Professor Loss has recently undertaken the 
task of recodifying federal securities laws for the American Law Institute. 
25~ 393 U.S. 453 (1969). 
165 Id. at 465. This_language would seem to render impractical Professor Ruder's 
proposal discussed at p. 490 sitpra. The variable factors in Ruder's plan necessitate 
a judicial rather than an administrative implementation. 
106 Panel Discussion-The Emergence of Federal Corporation Law and Federal 
Cotnrol of Inside Information, 34 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 228, 232 (1966) (remarks of 
Neil Kennedy). 
